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BRIEF OF AMICA CURIAE DEBORAH A.
DEMOTT IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
This brief is submitted on behalf of Deborah A.
DeMott as amica curiae in support of petitioner.1
INTEREST OF AMICA CURIAE
Deborah A. DeMott is the David F. Cavers Professor of Law at Duke University where she has been
a member of the law faculty since 1975. Professor
DeMott served as the sole Reporter for the American
Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of Agency, published in 2006. She is the author, among other
works, of Fiduciary Obligation, Agency and Partnership, published in 1991. She has held appointment
as the Centennial Visiting Professor in the Law Department of the London School of Economics and has
served as a Fulbright Senior Scholar at Sydney and
Monash Universities in Australia, and she has been
the New Zealand Legal Research Foundation Visiting Fellow at the University of Auckland, in addition
to teaching and lecturing at other universities in the
United States and abroad. In addition to her scholarship on agency and fiduciary obligation, she has
written on corporate law, takeovers, and acquisi-

Pursuant to Rule 37.6, counsel for amica curiae state that
no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part,
and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended
to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person
or entity other than amica curiae or her counsel has made a
monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this
brief. The parties have consented to the filing of this brief, and
letters reflecting their consent have been filed with the Clerk.
1

2
tions.2
Amica has no stake in the outcome of this case
other than her academic interest in the logically coherent development of the law. Amica is filing this
brief because this case could implicate fundamental
doctrines in the common law of agency, and amica
believes her unique perspective may assist the Court
in its resolution of this case.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In an agency relationship, “one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’)
that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and
subject to the principal’s control, and the agent
manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (2006) (hereinafter Restatement (Third)). Acting “on behalf of” the
principal, the agent represents the principal in interactions with third parties.
A relationship of agency is also a fiduciary relationship, id. § 1.01, which requires the agent to act
“loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship,” id. § 8.01. Like
its consensual nature, the fiduciary character of
agency has long been recognized as essential to the
relationship. Justice Story long ago noted the “plain
and obvious consideration” that a “principal bargains, in the employment, for the exercise of the disinterested skill, diligence, and zeal of the agent, for
his own exclusive benefit.” Joseph Story, CommenInstitutional affiliations are listed for identification purposes only.
2
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taries on the Law of Agency § 210 (N. St. John Green
revisor 1874, 8th ed.) (reprinted 2006) (hereinafter
Story, Commentaries). The principal retains the
agent with “a confidence necessarily reposed in the
agent, that he will act with a sole regard to the interests of his principal, as far as he lawfully may.”
Id.
This case concerns Cory Maples—a prisoner on
death row—whose attorney-agents most certainly
did not “act with a sole regard to the interests of
[their] principal.” In particular, Clara Ingen-Housz
and Jaasi Munanka were associates at Sullivan &
Cromwell LLP, but in accordance with that firm’s
pro bono representation policy, they represented
Maples “on an individual basis.” Pet. App. 257a.
John Butler, local Alabama counsel, also appeared
on Maples’s behalf, but acted only to allow IngenHousz and Munanka to proceed pro hac vice. Butler
had no other role in the case, and, indeed, actively
avoided any substantive representation of Maples.
Pet. App. 255a-56a.
As recounted in detail in Maples’s opening merits
brief, see Pet. Op. Br. 9-13, Ingen-Housz and
Munanka filed a post-conviction petition on Maples’s
behalf in Alabama state trial court. The trial court
denied the petition. By that time, however, the two
attorneys had left Sullivan & Cromwell, without informing the court or substitute counsel. One counsel
left the United States for a government position with
the European Commission in Brussels. Pet. App.
258a. The other remained in the United States to
become a law clerk to a federal judge, a position that
precluded his representation of private clients. Pet.
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App. 258a.
When the trial court denied Maples’s petition, the
clerk’s office sent notice to his pro bono counsel of
record—Ingen-Housz and Munanka—as well as to
Butler.
The notices sent to Ingen-Housz and
Munanka were returned to the court clerk’s office,
marked “Return to Sender” and “Left Firm.” In response, the clerk’s office did nothing. And since Butler played no substantive role in the case whatsoever, he also did nothing. Maples’s statutory deadline for appealing the denial of his post-conviction
petition passed. The Alabama courts subsequently
denied Maples’s attempts to appeal as time-barred,
and Maples sought to file a habeas corpus petition in
federal court.
The courts below held that Maples is foreclosed
from seeking federal habeas corpus relief based on a
procedural default that was indisputably no fault of
his own. It was, instead, attributable to the actions
of Maples’s pro bono attorneys—who left Maples
without any authorized attorney to represent him in
his state post-conviction proceedings at a time when
they nevertheless remained his attorneys of record
in the case—and of Butler, who had never taken on a
true representation in the first place. The central
question in the case when it comes to whether attorney conduct may constitute cause to excuse the default is whether those attorneys’ error can be attributed to Maples.
Under settled agency principles, the answer is
clearly no. No putative agent had actual authority
to bind Maples during the relevant period. Under
fundamental principles of agency law, the principal-
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agent relationship between Maples and his New
York counsel terminated before the procedural default, either because Maples’s attorneys acted disloyally by abandoning him, or because they renounced their agency. Nor can Maples be held responsible for Butler’s actions (or inaction). Butler
was, at most, a subagent retained by Ingen-Housz
and Munanka to allow them to participate pro hac
vice, and for no other purpose. Under agency law,
his agency ended with Ingen-Housz’s and
Munanka’s. And even if Butler can be said to have
been Maples’s agent, Butler terminated the agency
through renunciation and disloyalty to his putative
principal. Finally, neither the mistakes of any other
Sullivan & Cromwell attorney, nor of personnel in
the Sullivan & Cromwell mailroom, can be imputed
to Maples, because none of those actors was ever authorized to act as Maples’s agents before the default.
Nor can the state take solace in the doctrine of
apparent authority. That doctrine in many circumstances allows a third party to bind a principal to the
acts of a putative agent, even when the agent acts
without actual authority. But that doctrine has no
application with respect to the relationship between
a lawyer and a client in fundamental matters left to
the client’s discretion, especially when (as here) the
client has little to no control over his lawyer. And in
any event, the doctrine of apparent authority would
not help the state even if applicable. In short,
agency principles would not permit holding Maples
responsible for the procedural default in this case.
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ARGUMENT
I.

This Court Has Suggested That Principles Of Agency Law Provide Guidance
For When An Attorney’s Actions Should
Be Attributed To His Client In The Habeas Corpus Context

The relationship between a client and his attorney is generally one of principal and agent. Thus,
agency law provides a natural framework for determining whether and how an attorney’s conduct
should be attributed to the client. As the principal’s
representative, an attorney-agent acts “on behalf of”
the principal in the agent’s interactions with third
parties. Restatement (Third) § 1.01. Based on this
framework, this Court has consistently mined
agency law principles in determining whether an attorney’s actions or inactions should be imputed to
the affected clients.
For example, this Court has held that an attorney’s behavior could not excuse a party from a dismissal for failure to prosecute a civil suit, explaining
that “[p]etitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as
his representative in the action, and he cannot now
avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of
this freely selected agent. Any other notion would be
wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation, in which each party is deemed bound
by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to
have notice of all facts, notice of which can be
charged upon the attorney.” Link v. Wabash R. Co.,
370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962) (quotation omitted).
Similarly, this Court has held that a Title VII statute of limitations—which is triggered by an EEOC
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complainant’s receipt of a notice from that agency—
begins to run when the complainant’s lawyer receives the required notification. The Court reiterated that “[u]nder our system of representative litigation, ‘each party is deemed bound by the acts of
his lawyer-agent and is considered to have notice of
all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.’” Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S.
89, 92 (1990) (quoting Link, 370 U.S. at 634 (quotation omitted)).
The Court has similarly invoked agency principles in the specific context of federal habeas corpus
actions, and in particular in determining whether a
habeas petitioner can demonstrate “cause” for a procedural default in state court. In Murray v. Carrier,
although the Court did not specifically rely on
agency law, it did explain that unless a defendant’s
counsel was constitutionally ineffective, “we discern
no inequity in requiring [the defendant] to bear the
risk of attorney error that results in a procedural default.” 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). And in Coleman v.
Thompson, the Court made its reliance on agency
principles in the procedural default context explicit,
holding that “[a]ttorney ignorance or inadvertence is
not ‘cause’ because the attorney is the petitioner’s
agent when acting, or failing to act, in furtherance of
the litigation, and the petitioner must ‘bear the risk
of attorney error.’” 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991) (quoting
Murray, 477 U.S. at 488). Any other rule, the Court
explained, “would be contrary to well-settled principles of agency law.” Id. at 754 (citing Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 242 (1958) (hereinafter Restatement (Second))).
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If agency principles justify binding parties to the
mistakes of their lawyers, then it follows that parties—including habeas petitioners—are not bound by
lawyers’ errors when the lawyer is not acting as the
party’s agent. As Justice Alito recently explained,
“[c]ommon sense dictates that a litigant cannot be
constructively responsible for the conduct of an attorney who is not operating as his agent in any
meaningful sense of that word.” Holland v. Florida,
130 S. Ct. 2549, 2568 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment); see also id. at
2573 n.9 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that an attorney’s “disloyalty or renunciation of his role” would
“terminate [his] authority” (citing Restatement (Second) §§ 112, 118)).
Of course, to say that agency principles provide
guidance in this context is not to say that agency law
must be applied here as strictly or comprehensively
as it would be elsewhere. The consequences of applying strict rules governing when an unknowing
principal is bound by his agent are not normally as
severe as they would be in this case due to the fact
that the petitioner is facing execution. And the
harshness of those consequences may counsel in favor of leniency unavailable to the ordinary principal
in an ordinary commercial or even litigation context.
That is especially true in light of the equitable principles governing habeas corpus. See, e.g., Holland,
130 S. Ct. at 2560-61. But the Court need not resolve that question here because, assuming agency
principles are applicable, their straightforward application leads to the conclusion that Maples should
not be held responsible for the procedural default in
this case.
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II.

Relevant Agency Doctrines

As explained, “[a]gency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the
agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject
to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests
assent or otherwise consents so to act.” Restatement
(Third) § 1.01. It is a fundamental principle of
agency law that whether and to what extent an
agency relationship exists does not turn on the labels
attached to the relationship. Rather, an “agency relationship arises only when the elements stated in
§ 1.01 are present. Whether a relationship is characterized as agency in an agreement between parties
or in the context of industry or popular usage is not
controlling.” Id. § 1.02.
There are three main doctrines under which a
principal can be bound by the acts of his agents: i) an
agent’s exercise of actual authority; ii) apparent authority; and iii) ratification. An agent has actual authority to bind a principal “when, at the time of taking action that has legal consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance
with the principal’s manifestations to the agent, that
the principal wishes the agent so to act.” Restatement (Third) § 2.01. The scope of an agent’s actual
authority depends on the extent to which the principal has delegated that authority, either explicitly or
through his manifestations. Id. § 2.02.
The doctrine of apparent authority, in contrast,
operates parallel to actual authority and asks when
a principal can be bound by a putative agent’s acts,
even in the absence of actual authority. Apparent
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authority is the “power held by an agent or other actor to affect a principal’s legal relations with third
parties when a third party reasonably believes the
actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal
and that belief is traceable to the principal’s manifestations.” Restatement (Third) § 2.03. When a
principal is bound vis-à-vis a third party on the basis
of the putative agent’s apparent authority, the principal nevertheless can recover from the agent if there
was in fact no actual authority. Restatement (Third)
§§ 2.03 cmt. a, 8.09 cmt. b.
Finally, a person may be bound by a prior act of
another through ratification, i.e., assent to the prior
act. See Restatement (Third) § 4.01.
There is no plausible argument that Maples ever
ratified his purported attorneys’ failure to timely appeal the denial of his post-conviction petition. Part
III explains why no putative agent had actual authority to bind Maples during the relevant period.
And Part IV explains why the doctrine of apparent
authority has no application in this context, and why
it would in any event not help the state.
III.

No Putative Agent Had Actual Authority
To Bind Maples During The Relevant Period, And Agency Principles Thus Preclude Holding Maples Responsible For
The Procedural Default In This Case

No putative agent had actual authority to bind
Maples during the relevant period, i.e., between the
trial court’s denial of his post-conviction petition and
the day the time limit to appeal that determination
lapsed. Accordingly, the procedural default in this
case cannot be attributed to Maples under agency
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principles.
A.

Maples’s Pro Bono Counsel Terminated Their Agency Before The
Relevant Period, And Their Acts
Thus Cannot Be Attributable To
Maples

The most significant potential principal-agent relationship at issue in this case is the one between
Maples and his post-conviction pro bono counsel of
record, Clara Ingen-Housz and Jaasi Munanka. For
the reasons explained below, Ingen-Housz’s and
Munanka’s conduct is not attributable to Maples under ordinary principles of agency law.
1. Under fundamental agency principles, an
agent must “act loyally for the principal’s benefit in
all matters connected with the agency relationship,”
id. § 8.01, a duty that “disallows the pursuit of selfinterest as a motivating force in actions the agent
determines to take on the principal’s behalf,” id. cmt.
b. An agent breaches this duty by assuming a stance
“antagonistic” to the principal, see Floyd R. Mechem,
A Treatise on the Law of Agency § 1189 (2d ed. 1914),
because the principal “has a right to assume when
he employs an agent, unless he is advised to the contrary, that the agent is in a situation to give to his
principal that undivided allegiance and loyalty
which the proper performance of the agency requires, and that he will remain in that situation.”
Id. § 1206 (emphasis added).
An ongoing agency relationship may of course be
terminated by mutual consent, Restatement (Second)
§ 117, or unilaterally by the principal, id. § 118. The
relationship can also be terminated by the conduct of
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the agent. Thus, for example, the agency relationship terminates if the agent, “without knowledge of
the principal … is … guilty of a serious breach of
loyalty to the principal.” Id. § 112; see also Restatement (Third) § 5.04 (“[N]otice of a fact that an agent
knows or has reason to know is not imputed to the
principal if the agent acts adversely to the principal
in a transaction or matter, intending to act solely for
the agent’s own purposes or those of another person.”). Similarly, an agent’s renunciation terminates
the agency relationship, Restatement (Second) § 118,
and the “agent may manifest renunciation by conduct inconsistent with the continued performance of
his duties to the principal,” id. § 119 cmt. b.
2. Ingen-Housz and Munanka terminated the
agency relationship by abandonment, if not also by
renunciation.
Maples’s counsels of record ended their representation to accept other employment on terms that effectively if not legally forbade the representation—
including the continuing representation—of a private client like Maples.
While Maples’s postconviction petition was pending before the Alabama
trial court, Ingen-Housz left the country and joined
the European Commission in Belgium, and
Munanka left the firm to become a law clerk to a
federal judge in New York. Pet. App. 258a. IngenHousz and Munanka knew that their acceptance of
such employment would disable them, both legally
and logistically, from continuing to represent petitioner. Moreover, Ingen-Housz and Munanka left
the representation without notifying the court or
substituting counsel, as required by Alabama law—

13
leaving Maples without authorized pro bono counsel
in the proceeding at a time when he believed he was
in fact represented.
a. Ingen-Housz’s and Munanka’s conduct plainly
terminated the agency relationship, even though
they remained Maples’s pro bono attorneys of record
in the case. Abandoning a client contravenes the
“plain and obvious” undertaking of loyal service to
the principal’s interests that underpins any agency
relationship. See Story, Commentaries § 210. The
agency relationship terminates in the face of such
disloyalty even without a communication of renunciation from the agent to the principal. See Restatement (Second) § 112 (agency relationship terminates
if the agent, “without knowledge of the principal …
is … guilty of a serious breach of loyalty to the principal”).
The abandonment (and thus disloyalty) by Maples’s pro bono attorneys of record is obvious here.
Ingen-Housz and Munanka left their representation
of Maples without substituting counsel or notifying
the court—leaving Maples unrepresented in his
state post-conviction proceeding at a time when Ingen-Housz and Munanka were “still attorneys of record” in Maples’s case. Pet. App. 223a.3 Because of
Whether Maples believed his “lawyers at Sullivan and
Cromwell” (J.A. 253) were Ingen-Housz and Munanka, or
“other attorneys at the firm,” as the state has suggested, Br. in
Opp. 34, the fact is that—as the Alabama court itself found,
Pet. App. 223a—Maples was left unrepresented in the action at
the time of the default. Under either account, therefore, Maples was abandoned, believing that he was represented in the
Alabama post-conviction proceeding when in fact he was not.
3
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Ingen-Housz’s and Munanka’s actions, the Alabama
court clerk’s office sent notifications to the departed
attorneys at their former law firm, and those notices
were returned to the sending court stamped “Return
to Sender,” with one envelope carrying the handwritten addition: “Left Firm.” As a result, neither
counsel of record—nor anyone remaining at the law
firm—learned of the petition’s denial.
b. Termination through renunciation may be
found based on an agent’s conduct under even less
egregious circumstances. The Restatement (Second)
illustrates:
A is P’s local agent in town X. A moves
away without communication to P, intending to abandon the old job and obtain a
new one. Failing to get it, he returns
promptly to X and transacts business for
P. In the meantime P learns of A’s conduct. It may be found that A's authority is
terminated.
Restatement (Second) § 119 illus. 5. Termination of
authority follows a fortiori on the facts here. Unlike
in the illustration, neither Ingen-Housz nor
Munanka returned purporting to resume their representation of Maples. And, as explained, both attorneys took new jobs that made it impossible to continue the representation. The agency relationship
was terminated under a straightforward application
of agency principles.
The actions by Maples’s attorneys do not meet
any plausible standard for attributing responsibility.
Their conduct was not the ordinary or mundane negligence of an otherwise faithful lawyer-agent. See,
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e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753. Rather, either their
abandonment (disloyalty) or their renunciation
served to end the agency relationship altogether.
Translated into the immediate habeas context, Maples’s state-level procedural default should be excused, because it was the fault of attorneys who were
no longer serving as Maples’s agents, and their conduct thus cannot be attributed to him.
B.

Local Counsel’s Conduct Cannot Be
Imputed To Maples

As explained, apart from Ingen-Housz and Munanka, John Butler, local Alabama counsel, also appeared on Maples’s behalf in the Alabama trial
court. Butler received notice from the state court of
the denial of Maples’s post-conviction petition but
did nothing in response. Butler’s conduct cannot be
attributable to Maples under agency principles.
Although Butler filed an appearance stating that
he was Maples’s counsel, that did not give him actual authority to bind Maples as his agent. As explained above, the question whether a putative
agent has actual authority to bind a principal does
not depend on labels. Rather, the existence and
scope of actual authority are determined by whether
the elements of an agency relationship have as a
matter of fact been established. See Restatement
(Third) § 1.02. Butler’s failure to act on the notice of
the denial of Maples’s post-conviction petition does
not bind Maples under agency law, for several reasons.
First, even if Butler did have some agency authority, his duty would best be described under
agency law not as that of Maples’s agent, but as In-
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gen-Housz’s and Munanka’s subagent. “A subagent
is a person appointed by an agent to perform functions that the agent has consented to perform on behalf of the agent’s principal and for whose conduct
the appointing agent is responsible to the principal.”
Restatement (Third) § 3.15. That aptly describes
Butler’s limited role here. Butler fulfilled a narrowly
defined function as an intermediary or middleman of
sorts, which was to obtain the pro hac vice admission
of counsels of record in Alabama courts. See Pet.
App. 255a. Butler performed no other role and there
is no indication that Butler ever communicated with
Maples, or that Maples understood him to play any
role in his defense. Although the Alabama rules required the inclusion of local counsel’s name on “all
notices, orders, pleadings, and other documents filed
in the cause,” J.A. 365-66, counsels of record had
agreed that local counsel would bear no substantive
responsibility toward petitioner. Pet. App. at 256a.
Given the onus placed on Ingen-Housz and Munanka
to find and retain local counsel, at most Butler occupied the role of Ingen-Housz’s and Munanka’s subagent, to whom they delegated responsibility for
enabling their representation of Maples pro hac vice.
Because Butler is best classified as a subagent,
his actual authority to bind Maples terminated with
that of Ingen-Housz and Munanka. “Whether a subagent acts with actual authority depends on three
separate consensual relationships: (1) between principal and appointing agent; (2) between appointing
agent and subagent; and (3) between principal and
subagent. A subagent’s actual authority terminates
upon notice to the subagent that any of these relationships is severed.” Restatement (Third) § 3.15
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cmt. e. And under agency doctrine, a person has “notice” of a fact when the person “knows the fact, has
reason to know it, has received an effective notification of the fact, or should know the fact to fulfill a
duty owed to another person.” Id. § 5.01(3).
Here, as explained, Ingen-Housz and Munanka
severed their agency relationship with Maples, either through abandonment (disloyalty) or renunciation. See supra Part III.A. And Butler had “notice”
of that severance; as Maples’s local counsel and Ingen-Housz’s and Munanka’s subagent, he plainly
“should [have] know[n],” in order “to fulfill [his] duty
to” Maples, that the attorneys who Butler had insisted would handle all matters in Maples’s case had
in fact ended their representation. Id. § 5.01(3); see
also Story, Commentaries § 469 (explaining that the
subagency is automatically terminated upon severance of the primary agency relationship because the
subagency is a “dependent power,” and because termination is “a natural result from the presumed intention of the principal”). Thus, when Ingen-Housz
and Munanka terminated their agency relationship
with Maples, so too did they sever Butler’s authority
to act as a subagent.
Second, even if Butler could have been considered
Maples’s agent at one time, his failure to respond to
the notice of the denial of Maples’ post-conviction petition cannot be attributable to Maples, because Butler severed the agency through his intentional conduct. As explained, an agent must “act loyally for
the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with
the agency relationship,” Restatement (Third) § 8.01,
a duty that “disallows the pursuit of self-interest as
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a motivating force in actions the agent determines to
take on the principal’s behalf,” id. cmt. b. But Butler
plainly did not act in accordance with his duty of
loyalty in any matter other than assuring that Ingen-Housz and Munanka could appear pro hac vice.
Indeed, Butler informed Ingen-Housz and Munanka
“at the outset of the case” that he would have no role
beyond allowing the New York attorneys to appear
pro hac vice, because he “did not have the resources,
available time or experience” to take on any broader
role. Pet. App. 255a. And although Butler communicated those restrictions to Ingen-Housz and
Munanka, nothing in the record suggests that they
were communicated to Maples.
By so restricting the range of his activity, local
counsel abandoned petitioner and severed any
agency relationship between them. To be sure,
unlike Ingen-Housz and Munanka, local counsel did
not leave the physical site of his law practice, but the
impact of his considered inaction was the same for
petitioner—Butler ceased to function (indeed, never
began to function) as Maples’s agent. Even though
Butler agreed to the use of his name in filings, his
renunciation and conduct provided Maples with
“counsel in name only.” McLaughlin v. Lee, 2000
WL 34336152, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 19, 2000). And if
Butler’s conduct were not enough by itself to sever
the agency relationship, the given reason for that
conduct certainly would be. Butler’s stated motivation for his inaction was explicitly self-regarding,
viz., his preference to allocate his “resources,” including his time, to his own ends or those of other clients,
rather than to Maples. Butler’s representation restrictions and his inaction thus constituted a serious
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breach of his duty of loyalty to Maples, which plainly
severed any agency relationship that may have existed. Maples cannot be held responsible for the actions (or inaction) of local “counsel,” who was—if an
agent at all—an agent in name only.
C.

The Failure Of Other Potential
Agents At Sullivan & Cromwell To
Respond To The Denial Of Maples’s
Post-Conviction Petition Cannot Be
Attributed To Maples

The state may argue that Maples can be held responsible for the mistakes of other attorneys at Sullivan & Cromwell, or by personnel in that firm’s mail
room. Not so.
1. No other attorneys at Sullivan & Cromwell received notice of the denial of Maples’ post-conviction
petition. To the extent that their failure to become
notified was negligent, that negligence cannot be
imputed to Maples for the simple reason that no Sullivan & Cromwell attorney other than Ingen-Housz
and Munanka was ever Maples’s agent in the state
post-conviction proceeding or could have had actual
authority to act for Maples.
The record evidence is clear that “[l]awyers at
S&C handle pro bono cases on an individual basis.”
Pet. App. 257a. Thus, according to the record, when
Maples engaged Ingen-Housz and Munanka as his
agents, he engaged only them, and not their law firm
or any other individuals in the firm. And while
other lawyers at the firm reportedly may have made
plans to take over Maples’s representation when Ingen-Housz and Munanka departed, they never became Maples’s authorized agents in the post-
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conviction proceeding before the default.
First, because any other Sullivan & Cromwell attorneys would have represented Maples in their individual capacity, there would be no agency relationship unless Maples manifested his assent to have
such individuals act as his agents in his postconviction proceeding. See, e.g., Restatement (Third)
§ 1.01 (requiring that the principal “manifests assent” that “the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control”). The record does not answer whether such assent was given.
Second, even if Maples agreed to have other attorneys at Sullivan & Cromwell represent him, he
still would not be bound by their actions (or inactions). Under agency law, the “failure to acquire a
qualification by the agent without which it is illegal
to do an authorized act … terminates the agent’s authority to act.” Restatement (Second) § 111.
And,
as the Alabama court itself found, no other Sullivan
& Cromwell attorney became admitted to practice in
Alabama during the relevant period. Thus, no other
Sullivan & Cromwell attorney could have had actual
authority to bind Maples.4
Third, and finally, even if other attorneys at Sullivan & Cromwell were at any point Maples’s agent,
they abandoned him. No one at the firm made any
It goes without saying that the later efforts of Sullivan &
Cromwell attorneys to represent Maples and to cure the procedural default do not remedy the fact that no attorney, including
any Sullivan & Cromwell attorney, acted as Maples’ agent during the relevant time period—between the time the trial court
denied Maples’s post-conviction petition and the running of the
statute of limitations to appeal that denial.
4
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effort to file an appearance in the Alabama trial
court or to otherwise investigate the state of play
there, even though they presumably knew that Ingen-Housz and Munanka were gone and would no
longer have any role in Maples’s case. That is not
simply negligent conduct, as missing a filing deadline would be. It is disloyal conduct, because it deprives Maples of any representation at all—when
Maples believed he was represented by counsel in
that proceeding. Accordingly, even if any Sullivan &
Cromwell attorney other than Ingen-Housz or
Munanka was ever Maples’s agent, they severed that
relationship by failing to give Maples their undivided loyalty.
2. Maples is similarly not chargeable with the
actions or errors of personnel in Sullivan & Cromwell’s mail room, which returned the notices of the
denial of Maples’s post-conviction petition to the
state. As explained, Ingen-Housz and Munanka, and
not the firm itself, were petitioner’s agents. Once
counsel abandoned their agency relationship with
petitioner, any conceivable basis for holding Maples
responsible for mishaps in the mailroom terminated
as well.
In any event, under Alabama’s Rule of Professional Conduct 5.3(c), a lawyer is generally not responsible for conduct of a nonlawyer that, if done by
a lawyer, would breach the lawyer’s duties. The only
potentially relevant exception to that rule is if the
lawyer specifically ordered or ratified the conduct or
is a partner in a law firm with direct supervisory re-
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sponsibility over the nonlawyer.5 But there is no evidence that any lawyer specifically ordered or ratified
any conduct of the mailroom here, or had direct supervisory responsibility over the mailroom at all. As
such, even if Ingen-Housz and Munanka had been
employed by the firm at the time of the mailroom’s
actions, they would not have been chargeable with
the mailroom’s conduct under this Rule. As IngenHousz and Munanka never had responsibility for the
conduct of those in the mail room, the actions of the
mail room are no different than if FedEx or UPS had
failed to deliver the notices in the first place. In no
event can the mailroom’s conduct be attributed to
Maples.
IV.

The Doctrine Of Apparent Authority Has
No Application In This Context

The only other plausible basis on which to hold
Maples responsible for his putative agents’ conduct
is the doctrine of apparent authority, under which a
third party may bind a principal to the acts of a putative agent, even when the agent has no actual authority, “when a third party reasonably believes the
actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal
and that belief is traceable to the principal’s maniRule 5.3(c) says that “[a] lawyer shall be responsible for
conduct of [a nonlawyer] that would be a violation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer, if (1) The
lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct,
ratifies the conduct involved; or (2) The lawyer is a partner in
the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct
at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated
but fails to take reasonable remedial action.”
5
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festations.” Restatement (Third) § 2.03. Apparent
authority has no application in the context of the relationship between a criminal defendant and his
lawyer, particularly in the circumstances of this
case. And even if it did, that doctrine would not hold
Maples responsible for the conduct of any putative
agent.
A.

The Doctrine Of Apparent Authority Does Not Apply In The Context
Of A Lawyer And His Client, At
Least In The Circumstances Here

The doctrine of apparent authority has no application here, for several reasons.
To begin, the doctrine of apparent authority is
generally inconsistent with ordinary understandings
of the attorney-client relationship, in which certain
fundamental decisions require that the agent act
with actual authority. Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers § 27 cmt. d (2000) (retaining
an attorney does not create apparent authority in
such matters as the decision to take a criminal appeal). While the client is of course bound by the conduct—even the negligent or wrongheaded conduct—
of his attorney acting within the scope of his agency,
it would be utterly bizarre to hold a client responsible for an attorney’s conduct when the attorney is not
acting as his agent at all. Were it otherwise, a lawyer purporting to represent a client but having no
actual authority could, for example, forfeit an appeal
or negotiate a guilty plea. That is not the law. Cf.
Restatement (Third) § 3.03 cmt. b (explaining that
clients may not be bound under the doctrine of apparent authority by an attorney’s attempt to settle a
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case).
The doctrine of apparent authority is a particularly poor fit in the context of this case, where the
putative principal is a death row inmate with little if
any control over his putative agent. As the statement of the general rule of apparent authority
makes clear, the underlying rationale for that doctrine stems from manifestations made by a principal
concerning an agent’s authority.
Restatement
(Third) § 2.03 & cmt. c. When the principal is in
control of manifestations of authority, he is responsible for actions that third parties reasonably take in
response to the conduct of the putative agent. In
those circumstances, the principal is in a better position to disabuse the third party of the existence of
actual authority than the third party is to figure out
the parameters of the agency relationship for himself. But when the principal makes no manifestation
of authority, the doctrine of apparent authority loses
its bearings.
Maples had little or no control over his manifestation of authority concerning Ingen-Housz,
Munanka, Butler, or anyone else. The first two
abandoned him, and the third was never his agent in
the first place. Meanwhile, Maples was locked up in
a prison cell in Alabama and reasonably believed he
was represented by lawyers who would—and could—
consult with him and appeal the denial of his state
post-conviction petition when the court acted. Accordingly, Maples had no opportunity to renounce
his agents or cabin their authority.
Apparent authority is inapplicable in this context
for another reason. Normally, when a principal is
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bound vis-à-vis a third party on the basis of the putative agent’s apparent authority, the principal nevertheless can recover from the agent if there was in
fact no actual authority. Restatement (Third) §§ 2.03
cmt. a, 8.09 cmt. b. But here, Maples cannot possibly be made whole by bringing an action against any
of his putative agents. While they may be subject to
money damages, money cannot give back Maples’s
opportunity to appeal the denial of his postconviction petition in state court, or to challenge his
conviction and sentence in federal habeas. Indeed,
the radically asymmetrical consequences that would
result in applying the doctrine of apparent authority
here—Maples will be executed without any opportunity to challenge his conviction in federal habeas,
and without any adequate recourse against his fleeing agents, while the state would have to defend a
conviction in federal court, as it would have had to
do anyway—make clear that this doctrine is inapplicable in these circumstances.
B.

Even If The Doctrine Of Apparent
Authority Were Generally Applicable, It Would Not Bind Maples Here

Even if the doctrine of apparent authority were
applicable in this context, that doctrine would not
hold Maples responsible for the conduct of IngenHousz, Munanka, or Butler. As explained, a third
party may bind a principal only when the “third
party reasonably believes the actor has authority to
act on behalf of the principal.” Restatement (Third)
§ 2.03 (emphasis added). Thus, an agent ceases to
act with apparent authority “when it is no longer
reasonable for the third party with whom an agent
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deals to believe that the agent continues to act with
actual authority.” Id. § 3.11(2). “If a third party has
notice of facts that call the agent’s authority into
question, and these facts would prompt a reasonable
person to make inquiry of the principal before dealing with the agent, the agent does not act with apparent authority.”) Id. cmt. e. As explained, a person has “notice” of a fact when the person “knows the
fact, has reason to know it, has received an effective
notification of the fact, or should know the fact to fulfill a duty owed to another person.” Id. § 5.01(3).
The Alabama court clerk’s office could not have
had a reasonable belief that Ingen-Housz and Munanka continued to act as Maples’s agents. When the
“Return to Sender” and “Left Firm” notifications arrived back at the state courthouse, the court clerk—
and the state—were placed on notice of facts that
called into serious question whether petitioner continued to be represented by his counsels of record.
Yet despite receiving the notifications stamped “Return to Sender,” the state failed to make reasonable
inquiry into whether Ingen-Housz and Munanka
continued to serve as Maples’s agents.
The state is also precluded from relying on apparent authority as to Butler. The returned notices
from the counsels of record sufficed to place the clerk
on notice that something was seriously awry with
respect to Maples’s legal representation. The clerk
thus had “notice of facts that call” all of Maples’s
purported lawyers’ “authority into question.” Id.
cmt. e. Brief inquiries would have clarified the matter—and in time for an appeal within the relevant
42-day period—but the clerk did nothing. In all
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events, but particularly in a context with such grave
consequences for the principal, the state’s failure to
inquire into the circumstances of Maples’s representation precludes any reliance on the doctrine of apparent authority.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, if principles of agency
are applied, the judgment below should be reversed.
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